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1 Introduction
Increased international trade, export promotion and trade reform policies, have been
coincident with massive changes in the structure as well as the size of the South Korean
economy since 1963. Similar observations can be made about the modern industrialization
experiences of several Asian economies, most recently that of China. Yet most quantita-
tive models of structural change which evolved to account for the observed decline in the
employment share of agriculture and rise in that of industry during a country’s economic
development assume that the economy in question is closed and are silent on the impor-
tance of international trade and trade reform for shifts in the composition of employment
and production across sectors. In this paper, we develop a quantitative two-country, three
sector model to a) characterize analytically the role of international trade and trade policies
for changes in the composition of employment and production across sectors, and b) mea-
sure the importance of trade and trade policies for observed structural change in a series of
experiments in which the model is calibrated to data from South Korea and the OECD.
In closed economy investigations of structural change reallocations of employment and
production across sectors are driven by two key features.1 Provided goods are complements
resources are allocated out of sectors with the fastest productivity growth and into sectors
with the slowest productivity growth.2 One class of models emphasizes this role of differ-
ential productivity growth across sectors for structural transformation, and assumes that
consumer preferences are homothetic (Baumol (1967), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), and Ace-
moglu and Guerrieri (2008) are examples). A second class of models emphasizes the role
of non-homothetic consumer preferences in driving reallocations of resources across sectors.
Non-homothetic preferences imply that the income elasticity of demand is unequal across
goods (and non-unitary) and reallocations of resources across sectors result from income ex-
pansion, even when productivity growth is equal across sectors (see Caselli and Coleman II
1Herrendorf et al. (Forthcominga) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature.
2Verma (2012) is an example of structural transformation when final goods of different sectors are sub-
stitutes.
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(2001) and Gollin et al. (2002)). Other investigations, for example Rogerson (2008), employ
a hybrid approach; uneven productivity growth across sectors coupled with non-homothetic
preferences generates resource reallocations.
Quantitative research employing these models suggests that non-homothetic prefer-
ences are required to produce a sufficiently large movement of resources out of agriculture,
while uneven productivity growth contributes substantively to explaining observed reallo-
cations from industry to services observed in the later stages of development. Nonetheless,
Buera and Kaboski (2009) argue that not even a hybrid closed economy model can quan-
titatively account for US de-industrialization observed in the last two decades. Further,
Matsuyama (2009) argues that international trade may help account for diverse structural
transformation experiences in a broader cross section of countries. In mature economies such
as Germany and Japan, and also in some smaller emerging countries such as Hong-Kong,
and Taiwan, relatively rapid growth in measured manufacturing productivity has not pro-
duced a declining employment share of the sector. Matsuyama argues that relatively fast
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector may shift comparative advantage in its fa-
vor, increasing its net exports, so that the net effect for its domestic employment share can
be ambiguous or even positive.
In this paper, we qualitatively and quantitatively examine the role of international
trade and trade policies for re-allocations of employment and production in a three-sector,
two-country hybrid model of structural change with labor as the only factor of production.
We characterize the three sectors as agriculture, industry and services. An infinitely lived
representative household consumes a composite of the three sectors’ final goods and supplies
labor inelastically; labor is perfectly mobile across sectors, but internationally immobile.
Perfectly competitive final good producers in each sector aggregate in Armington fash-
ion domestically produced and imported varieties of that sector’s good. Perfectly competitive
firms in each sector employ domestic labor in a linear production function to produce each
country’s variety of the sector’s good, and exogenously determined labor productivity varies
2
over time, sectors and countries. Armington weights on domestic and imported varieties in
final good production, which are sector and country specific, are assumed to be “deep” pa-
rameters, originating from technological, geographical, and psychological real costs of trade
not otherwise explicitly modeled. We assume that prohibitively high trade costs for service
varieties preclude trade, and nor is there any trade in final goods.
We explicitly account for how the evolution of trade policies affects the relative prices of
varieties confronted by final good producers and consumer income. Specifically, a government
in each country offers proportional price subsidies to foreign final good producers importing
domestic varieties, and imposes proportional tariffs on domestic final good producers import-
ing foreign varieties. Tariff income net of subsidy payments of each government is rebated to
consumers as a lump-sum transfer. Tariff and subsidy rates can vary over time, sectors and
countries. The ratio of relative international labor productivities across sectors dictates the
pattern of comparative advantage, which is distorted by tariff and subsidy rates. However,
the pattern of inter-industry trade and specialization is also influenced by the static pattern
of Armington weights across countries and sectors, and relative importance of subsistence
consumption of agriculture across countries.
We compute the competitive equilibrium of our two-country world economy, which
- because of the presence of distortionary tariffs and subsidies - is not Pareto efficient in
general, and provide an analytical characterization of a sector’s employment and GDP share.
We calibrate the model to data from South Korea and the OECD over the period 1963
through 2000 when the bulk of Korean trade reform occurred and the OECD accounted for
a substantial 68 percent of South Korean exports and 71 percent of South Korean imports
annually on average. We carefully calibrate the crucial determinants of the international
pattern of trade and specialization as follows: the Armington weights are matched to an
observed sample average of expenditure on domestic and imported goods for each traded
good sector and country; the subsistence level of agricultural consumption is calibrated to
match the initial employment share of agriculture observed in Korea; and we construct and
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input Korean and OECD time-series of sector-specific labor productivity, export subsidy and
tariff rates. The employment and GDP share of a sector are identical in our model, owing
to Ricardian production of varieties. We quantify the fit of the model’s predicted structural
transformation by focusing on its ability to match the sectoral employment shares observed
in South Korea.
The model’s predicted shares of employment by sector are comparable to those observed
in the data. The model closely matches the observed decline in the employment share of
agriculture in Korea; the predicted decline from 0.63 to 0.08 is just 3 percentage points
more than the observed decline from 0.63 to 0.11. The model also does a reasonable job of
matching the observed growth in the employment share of Korean industry, predicting an
increase from 0.21 to 0.32 which is 7 percentage points less than the observed increase from
0.11 to 0.29. And the model’s predicted growth in services’ employment share from 0.15
to 0.60 over-predicts by 11 percentage points the observed increase from 0.25 to 0.61. The
correlations of actual and predicted employment shares are high and positive, ranging from
0.76 for industry to 0.96 for agriculture. The model fails to reproduce the downward portion
of the “hump-shape” in industry’s share of employment witnessed in South Korea, however.
Empirically, the share reached a peak of 0.36 in 1991 and fell to 0.29 by 2000. In the model,
only the rate of increase in industry’s employment share declines after 1991. And, we find
that the pattern of trade in our benchmark model involves Korean trade surpluses (deficits)
in industry (agriculture) throughout the sample. This is determined by the interaction
of international real income disparity with non-homothetic preferences rather than by the
pattern of comparative advantage for most of the period.
We conduct counter-factual experiments to answer two, quantitative questions. 1. How
important is international trade in the model’s accounting for structural transformation in
South Korea? 2. How important is trade reform, measured by the time series evolution of
tariffs and subsidies, in the model’s accounting for structural transformation in South Korea?
First, we compare the performance of our benchmark open economy model to a coun-
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terfactual variant in which the Korean economy is closed to international trade. The total
sum of squared prediction errors (SSE) of the closed economy is 91 percent higher than that
of the open economy. Second, we quantify the importance of evolution in the pattern of
comparative cost advantage by counterfactually letting OECD labor productivity by sector
be equal at every date to that in South Korea. Notably, this implies that there is little
relative income per capita growth in Korea either so the differences in sectoral allocations
between this and the closed economy primarily reflect the impact of trade policies. The
SSE of this counterfactual model is 56 percent higher than that of the benchmark economy.
In both experiments, abstraction from measured trade patterns and resulting specialization
results in a counterfactually low rate of labor reallocation from agriculture into industry.
However, the specialization induced by trade is also responsible for the benchmark model’s
failure to produce a downward portion of the hump-shape in industry’s employment share;
each counterfactual model predicts a small decline after 1996.
To quantify the importance of Korean trade reform for structural change we assume
that a) tariffs and b) industrial export subsidies in South Korea were counterfactually held
at their 1967 rates throughout the period 1968 to 2000. 1968 is the date which Sachs
and Warner (1995) identify with the initiation of trade reform in Korea. Abstracting from
tariff reform results in a quantitatively important deterioration of the model’s performance;
the SSE rises by 27 percent. From 1968 until 1983, labor fails to move from agriculture
into industry at the rate observed in the data and benchmark economy, and subsequently
labor is reallocated from industry into services at a counterfactually high rate. The muting
of industrialization results from the inter-temporal pattern of tariff reform by sector. In
1967 tariffs on agricultural products are higher than on industrial products but in 1968
there is substantial tariff reform in agriculture. Hence in our counterfactual experiment,
we artificially preserve a small, tariff derived edge in effective comparative advantage of
Korean agriculture relative to industry, which is eradicated in the benchmark model in
1968. Abstracting from industrial tariff reform in 1983 in the counterfactual exacerbates the
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reallocation of labor from industry to services.
We also abstract from export subsidy reform in industry, counterfactually holding
subsidies on Korean industrial exports constant at their 1967 rates and allowing subsidies to
agriculture and tariffs in both sectors and countries to evolve as in the benchmark economy.
Awarding a counterfactually high subsidy rate to Korean industry for much of the sample
distorts the pattern of comparative advantage in its favor, and deteriorates Korea’s terms
of trade, relative to the benchmark economy. As a result, there is excessive re-allocation
of labor into industry from agriculture after 1971, when measured industrial subsidies peak
in the benchmark economy and data and especially after 1980, when subsidies awarded to
agricultural exports are eliminated completely. The smaller increase in government transfers
after 1980 relative to our benchmark model also produces a smaller reallocation of labor
from industry to services. The performance of the model deteriorates markedly; the SSE
increases by 62 percent relative to the benchmark economy. Accounting for export subsidy
reform in the industrial sector is important for limiting the magnitude of industrialization
that the model produces relative to the data. Improved measures of agricultural subsidies
are needed for an evaluation of subsidy reform in that sector, however; in the absence of
comprehensive data on agricultural subsidies, we are forced to input the Korean industrial
subsidy series for both sectors in our benchmark economy.
Our framework precludes endogenous labor productivity responses to trade reform
policies and we likely underestimate the quantitative impact of trade reform for structural
transformation as a result. Nevertheless, the merit and novelty of our modeling of trade
reform as a sequence of sector-specific tariffs, subsidies and associated government transfers,
is that it permits independent analysis and quantification of how distortionary trade policies
effect structural change. The closely related multi-sector open economy analyses of Sposi
(2012), Teignier (2012), Ungor (2010), and Uy et al. (2011) all corroborate our finding that
trade is quantitatively important for explaining sectorial resource reallocations. However,
our work is unique in separately identifying the role of trade policies from that of non-
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distortionary trade costs and in emphasizing the role of non-homothetic preferences for trade,
specialization, and structural transformation in South Korea.
Ungor (2010), for example, develops a very similar two-country, three sector open
economy model and shows there is a substantial impact of trade with China and Chinese
manufacturing productivity growth for de-industrialization in the United States. However,
he neither models nor quantifies the role of trade costs or policies. Sposi (2012) focuses
on explaining differences in export and output shares rather than on employment shares
in his multi-country three sector model. His measurement of trade barriers includes tariffs
as a policy-related component of trade costs, but Sposi abstracts from export subsidies,
while tariff revenue melts in iceberg fashion and is non-distortionary. In his framework tariff
changes are not quantitatively important in influencing structural change; by contrast we
find that holding Korean tariffs at estimated pre-reform levels substantially diminishes the
fit of our model.
Uy et al. (2011) emphasize the role of trade in generating the hump pattern seen in Ko-
rea’s manufacturing sector employment and, like Sposi (2012), incorporate non-distortionary
iceberg trade costs. However, they do not independently measure tariffs. “Turning off” their
sector biased trade costs alters the pattern of comparative advantage and affects resource
allocation, but is silent on the quantitative impact of trade reforms for structural trans-
formation in Korea. Teignier (2012) argues that more rapid industrialization would have
occurred in Korea had agricultural production subsidies from 1972, and agricultural tariffs,
counter-factually been absent. However, his measurement of agricultural subsidies and tariffs
is rather arbitrary and the experiments essentially numerical. His two sector model abstracts
from all industrial trade policy reform.
We initiate our quantitative investigation of open economy structural change by re-
viewing the data on South Korea’s trade reform and development experience.
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2 Structural Change and Trade Reform in South Korea
Prior to 1963, South Korea was essentially a closed economy. From 1963, however, a
variety of export incentive and promotion policies were enacted and rapid export growth
ensued. Systematic reform, in the sense of reducing those incentives and the barriers to
free trade at world prices they represent, occurred from roughly 1971 and the policies were
completely phased out after 1980. In addition, extremely high barriers to imports in the
1950s and 1960s were systematically removed starting, in 1968, with selective quantitative
barrier and tariff reductions for agricultural products. Substantial and comprehensive tariff
reform for industrial and especially manufacturing products began only in 1979, with the
largest manufacturing tariff declines occurring in 1983. Tariff reform continued through the
last tariff rate reductions observed in our sample in 1994. 3
Figures 1a and 1b show the evolution of Korean bilateral exports and imports by sector
and in total with the OECD during the trade promotion and reform era that is our sample
period, 1963 through 2000. The OECD accounted for 68 percent of South Korean exports
and 71 percent of South Korean imports annually on average over this period. Unfortunately,
accurate and complete service sector trade data is unavailable for Korea or the OECD for
these years so the ‘total’ export and ‘total’ import trade measures in the figures comprise
the sum of agricultural and industrial exports and imports. We believe that this is a minor
omission, quantitatively.
The figures show that the export promotion and trade reform era in South Korea
was associated with a dramatic increase in the size of, and shift in the composition of, its
bilateral trade with the OECD. The size of total bilateral trade with the OECD increased
by a factor of three over a 38 year period; from about 13 percent of Korean GDP in 1963
to roughly 40 percent in 2000, while the composition of this trade shifted heavily in favor
of industrial exports and imports. Industrial sector exports, expressed as a share of GDP,
3We describe the composition and evolution of export promotion and tariff reform policies in detail in Appendix 1. In
addition, all data sources for this section and elsewhere in the paper, and detail on construction of data series, are described in
the Data Appendix (Appendix A).
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rose from practically zero in 1963 to reach about 20 percent of GDP in 2000. Agricultural
exports were trivial as a percentage of GDP throughout the sample period. Figure 1b shows
a similar shift towards industrial relative to agricultural imports.
2.1 Growth
Figure 2a shows that Korean trade reform, and the three-fold increase in the size
of South Korea’s bilateral OECD trade, was accompanied by a dramatic rise in real living
standards and labor productivity, measured by GDP per capita relative to the OECD. South
Korea’s real GDP per capita rose from about 12.5 percent of that in the OECD to roughly
43 percent, an increase of about 244 percent over the sample period. As shown in Figure 2b,
this is driven by a more than 200 percent increase in relative value added per worker in the
industrial sector, from about 23 percent to roughly 70 percent of that in the OECD. While
Korean agriculture and service sectors also saw increases in relative value added per worker,
these were dwarfed by that in the industrial sector. Notably, the data in Figure 2b show
that there was a shift in the pattern of comparative advantage between South Korea and the
OECD in favor of Korean industrial products after the mid-1970s, when relative industrial
productivity in Korea begins to grow rapidly.
2.2 Structural Transformation
Figure 3 shows that South Korea’s export promotion and trade reform era, trade growth
and growth in relative income and labor productivity also coincided with substantial struc-
tural transformation of the economy as is typical for developing countries. Figure 3a shows
the evolution of employment shares of the three major sectors of the economy, expressed as
a percentage of total employment, and Figure 3b shows the evolution of GDP shares of the
three sectors, expressed as a percentage of aggregate GDP.
A large decline in the employment and GDP share of agriculture and an increase in the
employment and GDP share of the industrial and service sectors occurred between 1963 and
2000. Specifically, in 1963 agriculture accounted for 63 percent of South Korean employment,
and 43 percent of GDP; by 2000, these shares had declined to 11 and 5 percent respectively.
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By contrast, the employment and GDP shares of industry rose from 11 and 20 percent to 29
and 42 percent respectively, while those of the service sector rose from 25 and 36 percent to
61 and 53 percent. The industrial sector’s employment share exhibits the “humped” shape
that is highlighted in the literature on structural change, declining to 29 percent in 2000 after
reaching a peak of 36 percent in 1991. GDP shares obviously evolve rather differently from
employment shares, with services showing much less GDP than employment share growth,
and industry greater growth. In the model that we develop employment and GDP shares
of a sector are identical owing to Ricardian production, however. We focus on employment
shares as our measure of structural change and calibrate the model accordingly.
This structural transformation of the South Korean economy is the object of our anal-
ysis. Specifically we seek to answer the questions: 1) To what extent was the structural
transformation in South Korea attributable to her openness to international trade over the
sample period 1963 through 2000, and to relative international labor productivity improve-
ments? 2) To what extent was the structural transformation attributable to the specific trade
reform policies adopted there? We now develop a quantitative model that, when calibrated
to Korean and OECD data and simulated, can potentially answer these questions.
3 Model
3.1 The Environment
We consider a three sector, two country world economy. Each country is inhabited by
an infinitely lived representative household with perfect foresight. Households derive utility
from a composite final consumption bundle and supply labor in-elastically to production.
Agents and countries are indexed by i, and we call the countries ‘home’ and ‘foreign’, so that
i=h,f. Time is discrete and indexed by t.
Three types of final good enter the composite consumed by the household called “Agri-
culture”, “Industry” and “Services”. We index these by k, with k =A,I,S. Each type of
good is exclusively produced by a single sector within each country, so that sectors are also
indexed by k=A,I,S. The sector k final good of country i is produced by combining in a
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constant returns to scale technology inputs of two varieties of good k ; variety i produced in
country i and variety j produced in country j 6= i. Varieties are therefore traded interna-
tionally; however, final consumption goods once produced are not traded. We assume, for
simplicity, that trade is balanced at every date which is approximately true of the year 2000
trade balance for industry and agriculture shown in Figure 1. We also assume that Service
varieties are not traded, so that final good producers in the service sector of country i simply
supply variety i to consumers.
Variety i of good k is produced in country i using a simple Ricardian technology in
which labor is the sole input. Labor productivity can differ by sector, country, and date and
the infinite sequence of labor productivities of each sector in both countries is exogenous.
Labor effort in variety production is mobile across sectors within country i, but immobile
across countries.
There is a government in each country which imposes proportional taxes on imported
units of each traded good, and rewards exports with proportional subsidies. Any net revenue
(expenditure) is rebated (financed) via a lump sum transfer (tax) to (on) the representative
household in that government’s country.
3.2 Households
Household i maximizes the lifetime utility function
max U i(Ci) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
Cψi,t − 1
ψ
, (3.1)
where 0 < β < 1 is a subjective time discount factor and Ci,t comprises a composite of the
three types of final good.
Ci,t =
(
ξA
(
CAi,t − A¯
)ω
+ ξI
(
CIi,t
)ω
+ ξS
(
CSi,t
)ω) 1
ω . (3.2)
Here, CAi,t, C
I
i,t and C
S
i,t are household i ’s consumption of Agriculture, Industry, and Services
respectively at date t, and A¯ denotes subsistence consumption of Agriculture. In addition,
ξk is the weight assigned to consumption of final good type k, ω governs the elasticity of
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substitution between the three types of final good, and ψ governs the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution. Preference parameters are assumed to be identical across countries.
Household i maximizes lifetime utility (3.1) by choice of consumption subject to (3.2)
and the budget constraint
∑
k
P ki,tC
k
i,t = wi,tNi,t + Ti,t ∀ t , (3.3)
where P ki,t is the consumer price of final good k (defined below in (3.7)), wi,t is the wage rate,
Ni,t is the household’s endowment of labor time, and Ti,t is the lump sum transfer from the
government of country i which may be positive or negative, depending on the relative size of
tariff revenue and the cost of export subsidies. Without loss of generality, we let the foreign
produced variety of industrial goods be the numeraire at every date.
3.3 Firms and Production
3.3.1 Varieties
A representative perfectly competitive firm in country i produces the ith variety of
good k at date t using a simple linear Ricardian technology:
yki,t = θ
k
i,tN
k
i,t ,
where θki,t is the productivity of labor, N
k
i,t the number of labor units employed, and y
k
i,t the
level of output. The representative variety i producer in sector k takes the prices of output
and labor as given, and chooses employment to solve the profit maximization problem.
max pki,ty
k
i,t − wi,tN
k
i,t
s.t. yki,t = θ
k
i,tN
k
i,t , and N
k
i,t ≥ 0. fori = h, f, k=A,I,S and ∀ t (3.4)
Here, pki,t is the producer price of variety i of good type k at date t.
3.3.2 Government
There is a government in each country which can choose taxes and subsidies subject
to a balanced budget at every date. Government i, i=h,f, imposes a per unit tax - τ ki,j,t -
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on units of variety j 6= i for sector k=A,I, imported from abroad by domestic final good
producers at date t. Government i may also award subsidies for units of variety i exported.
It does so by reducing the unit price paid by producer k=A,I in country j 6= i for imports
of variety i by a proportionate factor
ski,j,t
1+ski,j,t
which it pays directly to the exporting variety
producer. The unit price paid by country j 6= i importers for variety i of good k is therefore
pki,t
1+ski,j,t
. Country j tariffs are levied on this value as goods cross the border.
While tariffs raise the price of imported varieties confronted by domestic final good
producers, subsidies stimulate foreign demand for domestic varieties. We assume that the
tariff revenue net of the cost of subsidies is rebated to the consumer in the form of a lump
sum transfer so that the budget constraint of government i, i 6= j is
Tit =
∑
k
τ ki,j,t
pkj,t
(1 + skj,i,t)
ykj,i,t −
∑
k
ski,j,t
(1 + ski,j,t)
pki,ty
k
i,j,t for k = A, I, ∀ t . (3.5)
Here ykj,i,t is country i imports of variety j of good type k and y
k
i,j,t is country i exports of
variety i to country j of good k, i 6= j. The presence of distortionary taxes and subsidies
means that the equilibria we analyze are not, in general, Pareto efficient.
3.3.3 Final Goods
A representative perfectly competitive firm in each sector k of country i 6= j produces
final good k by using the following production functions:
Y ki,t =

(
µki
(
yki,i,t
)ρ
+ (1− µki )
(
ykj,i,t
)ρ)1/ρ
for k=A,I ,
yki,i,t = y
k
i,t for k=S .
Here, Y ki,t is total final output of good k, and y
k
i,i,t and y
k
j,i,t are domestic variety i and imported
variety j inputs respectively. In addition, µki is the weight assigned to variety i of good k,
(1 − µki ) is the weight assigned to imported variety j 6= i of good type k, and ρ reflects
the elasticity of substitution between locally produced and imported varieties. Following
convention in the international trade literature, we assume that the domestic and foreign
varieties are substitutes, or 0 < ρ < 1. Since Service varieties are not traded and sold only
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domestically, µSi = 1 for i=h,f.
The values of µki and ρ are exogenous determinants of final good producers’ allocation of
spending on local and imported varieties of inputs. We think of µki as a reduced form “home
bias” parameter; it captures primitive technological and preference factors which encourage
use of locally produced relative to imported varieties. These factors include all real costs of
trade that are not explicitly modeled as domestic country tariffs or foreign country subsidies
which discourage (encourage) imported variety use.
Final good producers of sector k take prices as given, as well as the government policies
that they confront, and solve the following profit maximization problem:
max P ki,tY
k
i,t − p
k
i,ty
k
i,i,t −
(1 + τ ki,j,t)
(1 + skj,i,t)
pkj,tyj,i,t
s.t. Y ki,t =
(
µki
(
yki,i,t
)ρ
+ (1− µki )
(
ykj,i,t
)ρ)1/ρ
. (3.6)
P ki,t is the consumer price index for good k and is given by
P ki,t =
(µki )1/(1−ρ) (pki,t)ρ/(ρ−1) + (1− µki )1/(1−ρ)
(
(1 + τ ki,j,t)
(1 + skj,i,t)
pkj,t
)ρ/(ρ−1)
(ρ−1)
ρ
(3.7)
Since µSi = 1, P
S
i,t = p
S
i,t .
3.4 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is an allocation {Ni,t, Ci,t, C
A
i,t, C
I
i,t, C
S
i,t}
∞
t=0 for household i ;
an allocation {Nki,t, y
k
i,t}
∞
t=0 for variety producer i of sector k ; an allocation {y
k
i,i,t, y
k
j,i,t, Y
k
i,t}
∞
t=0
for final good producer k in country i, i 6= j; prices {wi,t, p
k
i,t, P
k
i,t}
∞
t=0 for country i and sector
k ; and exogenous government policies {τ ki,j,t, s
k
i,j,t, Ti,t}
∞
t=0 for i = h, f ,i 6= j, and k = A, I, S;
such that for i = h, f and k = A, I, S,
(1) Given prices, household i’s allocation solves the maximization problem ((3.1)-(3.3));
(2) Given prices, variety i producer’s allocation solves the maximization problem (3.4) ∀ t ;
(3) Given prices, final good k producer’s allocation solves the maximization problem (3.6) ∀
t ;
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(4) Prices are such that labor markets clear
∑
k
Nki,t = Ni,t ∀ t ,
variety markets clear
yki,t = y
k
i,i,t + y
k
i,j,t , for k = A, I and ∀ t ,
yki,t = y
k
i,i,t , for k = S and ∀ t ,
and final goods markets clear
Y ki,t = C
k
i,t ∀ t ;
(5) Government i’s budget constraint is satisfied:
Tit =
∑
k
τ ki,j,t
pkj,t
(1 + skj,i,t)
ykj,i,t −
∑
k
ski,j,t
(1 + ski,j,t)
pki,ty
k
i,j,t ∀ t .
3.5 Analysis
3.5.1 Varieties
The first order conditions for the variety producer’s profit maximization problem imply
that labor is paid its marginal product if a variety is produced. In that event, the price of
variety i of the kth good at t is just
pki,t =
wi,t
θki,t
(3.8)
and when all goods are produced in country i their relative internal prices are simply the
inverse of relative labor productivities:
pAi,t
pIi,t
=
θIi,t
θAi,t
and
pSi,t
pIi,t
=
θIi,t
θSi,t
.
We focus on equilibria in which all three types of good are produced in each country, as we
observe in the Korean and OECD data.
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3.5.2 Final Goods
The first order conditions for profit maximization of final goods producer k in country
i 6= j imply that the shares of expenditure on final good type k in country i accounted for
by varieties i and j respectively are given by
Zki,i,t =
pki,tyi,i,t
P ki,tY
k
i,t
=
(
µki
) 1
1−ρ
(
pki,t
P ki,t
) ρ
ρ−1
, (3.9)
Zkj,i,t =
(1+τki,j,t)
(1+skj,i,t)
pkj,ty
k
j,i,t
P ki,tY
k
i,t
=
(
1− µki
) 1
1−ρ
 (1+τ
k
i,j,t)
(1+skj,i,t)
pkj,t
P ki,t

ρ
ρ−1
. (3.10)
For Services ZSj,i,t = 0. Finally, market clearing for final good k implies that P
k
i,tY
k
i,t = P
k
i,tC
k
i,t
for i = h, f and k = A, I, S ∀ t.
3.5.3 Households
The first order conditions for the household’s intra-temporal problem combined with
the budget constraint yield the size of expenditure on each type of good relative to the total
final consumption expenditure.
Eki,t ≡
P ki,tC
k
i,t
Ξi,t
=

ξ
1
1−ω
k (P ki,t)
ω
ω−1∑
m={A,I,S}
ξ
1
1−ω
m (Pmi,t)
ω
ω−1
(
1−
PAi,tA¯
Ξi,t
)
+
PAi,tA¯
Ξi,t
, if k = A
ξ
1
1−ω
k (P ki,t)
ω
ω−1∑
m={A,I,S}
ξ
1
1−ω
m (Pmi,t)
ω
ω−1
(
1−
PAi,tA¯
Ξi,t
)
, if k = I, S ,
(3.11)
where Ξi,t =
∑
k
P ki,tC
k
i,t is total final consumption expenditure.
3.5.4 World Equilibrium
The balanced trade or world payments equilibrium condition for our economy is derived
from the consumer’s budget constraint, and is, for country i=h,f, i 6= j
∑
k=A,I
1
1 + ski,j,t
pki,ty
k
i,j,t =
∑
k=A,I
1
1 + skj,i,t
pkj,ty
k
j,i,t . (3.12)
16
That is, once international government subsidy payments are accounted for, the effective
world prices at which trade occurs between importing final good producers and exporting
variety producers are producer prices adjusted for export subsidies.
3.5.5 Employment and GDP Structure
Value added (GDP) in country i at any date t is just the sum of the value of outputs
of each sector’s variety, Yi,t =
∑
k p
k
i,ty
k
i,t. Profits are zero in equilibrium, and labor is the
only production factor, so GDP is also measured by labor income at t, Yi,t = wi,t
∑
kN
k
i,t =
wi,tNi,t . Therefore, the GDP and employment share of sector are identical:
pki,ty
k
i,t
Yi,t
=
Nki,t
Ni,t
.∀t (3.13)
We now characterize the determinants of the economy’s structure in terms of the employment
and GDP shares of each sector k.
From the variety market clearing condition, the value added of variety i output in
sector k equals the sum of the value of domestic consumption and exports, or
pki,ty
k
i,t = p
k
i,t
(
yki,i,t + y
k
i,j,t
)
∀ t ,
where exports are zero for services. Dividing this by wi,tNi,t and using (3.13) yields
pki,ty
k
i,t
Yi,t
=
Nki,t
Ni,t
=
pki,t
(
yki,i,t + y
k
i,j,t
)
wi,tNi,t
=
(
pki,ty
k
i,i,t
P ki,tY
k
i,t
)(
P ki,tY
k
i,t
wi,tNi,t
)
+
(
pki,ty
k
i,j,t
P kj,tY
k
j,t
)(
P kj,tY
k
j,t
wi,tNi,t
)
Using (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), the final goods market clearing conditions, and the budget con-
straints of the households, we find the share of employment and GDP accounted for by sector
k at date t as:
pki,ty
k
i,t
Yi,t
=
Nki,t
Ni,t
= Zki,i,tE
k
i,t
(
1 +
Tit
wi,tNi,t
)
+
(
1 + ski,j,t
1 + τ kj,i,t
)
Zki,j,tE
k
j,t
(
1 +
Tjt
wj,tNj,t
)
wj,tNj,t
wi,tNi,t
Finally, substituting from (3.9) and (3.10) for the expenditure shares of final good producers
in each country on variety i, and from (3.11) for consumption expenditure shares, we obtain
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the following expressions for the employment and GDP share of Agriculture,
V Ai,t = µ
A
i
1
1−ρ
(
pAi,t
PAi,t
) ρ
ρ−1
 ξ
1
1−ω
A
(
PAi,t
) ω
ω−1∑
m={A,I,S}
ξ
1
1−ω
m
(
Pmi,t
) ω
ω−1
(
1−
PAi,tA¯
Ξi,t
)
+
PAi,tA¯
Ξi,t

(
1 +
Ti,t
wi,tNi,t
)
+ (1− µAj )
1
1−ρ
(
1 + sAi,j,t
1 + τAj,i,t
) 1
1−ρ
(
pAi,t
PAj,t
) ρ
ρ−1
 ξ
1
1−ω
A
(
PAj,t
) ω
ω−1∑
m={A,I,S}
ξ
1
1−ω
m
(
Pmj,t
) ω
ω−1
(
1−
PAj,tA¯
Ξj,t
)
+
PAj,tA¯
Ξj,t

(
1 +
Tj,t
wj,tNj,t
)
wj,tNj,t
wi,tNi,t
,
(3.14)
Industry,
V Ii,t = µ
I
i
1
1−ρ
(
pIi,t
P Ii,t
) ρ
ρ−1 ξ
1
1−ω
I
(
P Ii,t
) ω
ω−1∑
m={A,I,S}
ξ
1
1−ω
m
(
Pmi,t
) ω
ω−1
(
1−
PAi,tA¯
Ξi,t
)(
1 +
Ti,t
wi,tNi,t
)
+ (1− µIj )
1
1−ρ
(
1 + sIi,j,t
1 + τ Ij,i,t
) 1
1−ρ
(
pIi,t
P Ij,t
) ρ
ρ−1 ξ
1
1−ω
I
(
P Ij,t
) ω
ω−1∑
m={A,I,S}
ξ
1
1−ω
m
(
Pmj,t
) ω
ω−1
(
1−
PAj,tA¯
Ξj,t
)(
1
+
Tj,t
wj,tNj,t
)
wj,tNj,t
wi,tNi,t
,
(3.15)
and Services
(3.16)V Si,t =
ξ
1
1−ω
S
(
P Si,t
) ω
ω−1∑
m={A,I,S}
ξ
1
1−ω
m
(
Pmi,t
) ω
ω−1
(
1−
PAi,tA¯
Ξi,t
)(
1 +
Ti,t
wi,tNi,t
)
,
The first term on the right-hand side of equations (3.14) - (3.16) is what we call the
“domestic effect” for a sector’s GDP share; this is the share in GDP of domestic expendi-
ture on the domestic variety of sector k=A,I,S. For Agriculture and Industry, the domestic
effect is the product of the domestic variety’s share of domestic final output in the sector
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µki
1
1−ρ
(
pki,t
P ki,t
) ρ
ρ−1
, and the domestic consumption expenditure share of the sector in GDP. For
the Service sector, the domestic effect is simply the domestic consumption expenditure share
of the sector in GDP which wholly constitutes its employment and GDP share. Although
Services are not traded, their GDP share is influenced by international trade through the
prices indices of traded goods relative to that of Services, and government transfers.
Analogously, the second term on the right-hand side of (3.14) and (3.15) captures the
“foreign effect” for a sector’s GDP share in country i. It is the domestic GDP share of
exports of the sector, or the domestic GDP share of foreign country expenditure on the
domestic variety of sector k. This is the product of the domestic variety’s share of foreign
final output in sector k, (1 − µkj )
1
1−ρ
(
1+ski,j,t
1+τkj,i,t
) 1
1−ρ
(
pki,t
P kj,t
) ρ
ρ−1
, and the foreign consumption
expenditure share in domestic GDP of the sector.
3.5.6 Structural Change in the Open Economy
By structural change, we refer to (secular) change over time in the employment and
GDP shares of sectors. Time variation in domestic and foreign variety i expenditure shares
results from relative price changes for Agriculture and Industry, and time variation in con-
sumption expenditure shares results from relative price and income changes.
Using the definition of final good price indexes in (3.7) and the first order conditions
of variety producers in (3.8) we re-write the domestic variety expenditure shares in country
i GDP of domestic and foreign final good producers, for k=A,I, and i=h,f i 6= j, as
(
µki
) 1
1−ρ
(
pki,t
P ki,t
) ρ
ρ−1
=
1 + (1− µki
µki
) 1
1−ρ
(
(1 + τ ki,j,t)
(1 + skj,i,t)
wj,t
wi,t
θki,t
θkj,t
) ρ
ρ−1
−1 , (3.17)
(1− µkj )
1
1−ρ
(
1 + ski,j,t
1 + τ kj,i,t
) 1
1−ρ
(
pki,t
P kj,t
) ρ
ρ−1
=
(
1 + ski,j,t
1 + τ kj,i,t
)1
+
(
µkj
1− µkj
) 1
1−ρ
(
(1 + ski,j,t)
(1 + τ kj,i,t)
wj,t
wi,t
θki,t
θkj,t
) ρ
ρ−1
−1 .
(3.18)
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(3.17) and (3.18) are 1 and 0 for Services, respectively.
In (3.17), since we assume that foreign and domestic varieties are substitutes, 0 < ρ < 1,
if
(1+τki,j,t)
(1+skj,i,t)
wj,t
wi,t
θki,t
θkj,t
increases over time, the relative price of variety i confronted by domestic
final good k producers falls relative to that of the foreign variety, and the share of sector k
in domestic GDP rises due to more intensive use of the domestic variety. This occurs when
sector k domestic tariff rates increase relative to foreign subsidy rates, when sector k relative
domestic labor productivity increases, and when the relative foreign wage rises. Similarly,
in (3.18), increases in domestic subsidies relative to foreign tariffs, in relative domestic labor
productivity and the relative foreign wage promote a lower relative price and more intensive
use of the domestic variety abroad, and the share of sector k in country i rises as a result.
Finally, the higher is ρ and hence the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
imported varieties, the larger is the impact of changes in relative variety prices for sector k ’s
variety use and share of employment and GDP.
Relative prices of final goods are key determinants of domestic and foreign consumption
expenditure shares of sector k in country i GDP. As (3.11) shows, an increase in the relative
price of sector k ’s final good
ξ
1
1−ω
k (P ki,t)
ω
ω−1
∑
m={A,I,S} ξ
1
1−ω
m (Pmi,t)
ω
ω−1
causes consumer i to increase (decrease)
the share of consumption expenditure on that good if final goods are complements (substi-
tutes) or ω < (>)0 . Since the final price indexes of Agriculture and Industry are functions
of the prices of varieties i and j confronted by final good producers, time variation in country
and sector-specific productivity and trade policies are sources of expenditure switching by
the domestic consumer, and (3.14) - (3.16) show how this changes the size of a sector’s do-
mestic effect. The same statements apply to expenditure switching by the foreign consumer,
and the size of the foreign effect for Agriculture and Industry. Further, with non-homothetic
consumer preferences, growth in income causes expenditure on Agriculture to fall relative to
that of Industry and Services, as (3.11) shows. This can cause potentially large reallocations
of employment and GDP from agriculture into Industry and Services and, as (3.14) - (3.16)
show, in the open economy this mechanism affects both the domestic and export shares of
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sectors.
3.5.7 The Pattern of Trade and Comparative Advantage
In the model, intra-sector trade is exogenously motivated by Armington aggregation
of varieties4 and occurs irrespective of comparative advantage. Nevertheless, the pattern of
comparative cost advantage affects the relative producer prices of varieties across sectors and
countries, shares of expenditure on varieties by final good producers vary accordingly, and
inter-industry trade can result.
However, heterogeneity of Armington weights and of tariffs and subsidies across sectors
and countries, can distort variety expenditure shares and the pattern of trade from those
induced by comparative advantage. Further, international relative subsistence consumption
expenditure and relative international consumption expenditures on final goods in general,
can powerfully influence inter-industry trade.
To see that comparative cost advantage need not dictate the pattern of trade, we use
(3.14) - (3.15) to write the export (evaluated at world prices) to GDP ratio of sector k as
Xki,t
=
(
1
1 + τ kj,i,t
)1+( µkj
1− µkj
) 1
1−ρ
(
(1 + ski,j,t)
(1 + τ kj,i,t)
wj,t
wi,t
θki,t
θkj,t
) ρ
ρ−1
−1Ekj,t(1 + Tjtwj,tNj,t
)
wj,tNj,t
wi,tNi,t
.
(3.19)
and its import to GDP ratio as
Mki,t =
(
1
1 + τ ki,j,t
)1 + ( µki
1− µki
) 1
1−ρ
(
(1 + skj,i,t)
(1 + τ ki,j,t)
wi,t
wj,t
θkj,t
θki,t
) ρ
ρ−1
−1Eki,t(1 + Titwi,tNi,t
)
.
(3.20)
From (3.19) and (3.20), the trade to GDP ratio for sector k in country i is T ki,t = X
k
i,t+M
k
i,t ,
the trade to GDP ratio of country i is Ti,t =
∑
k=A,I T
k
i,t , and the trade balance of sector k
valued at world prices, is
TBki,t =
(
Xki,t −M
k
i,t
)
wi,tNi,t . (3.21)
4This is the simplest and most parsimonious specification of openness that can accommodate the large
intra-sector bilateral trade flows over the period 1963 to 2000 between South Korea and the OECD that we
observe at the high level of aggregation we are studying.
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World equilibrium requires that
∑
k=A,I TB
k
i,t = 0 for i = h, f . A necessary and
sufficient condition for sector k to run a trade surplus (deficit) and sector m 6= k to run
a deficit (surplus) in equilibrium is that Xki,t/M
k
i,t > (<)X
m
i,t/M
m
i,t or if, x
k
i,t ≡
(
Xki,t/M
k
i,t
Xmi,t/M
m
i,t
)
,
xki,t > (<)1 . Specifically, let k = A and m = I. Then
xAi,t = Λ
A
i,tΓ
A
i,tΘ
A
i,t , (3.22)
where
ΛAi,t =
(
1+τAi,j,t
1+τAj,i,t
)
(
1+τIi,j,t
1+τIj,i,t
) , ΓAi,t =
 1+
(
µAi
1−µA
i
) 1
1−ρ
(
(1+sAj,i,t)
(1+τA
i,j,t
)
wi,t
wj,t
θAj,t
θA
i,t
) ρ
ρ−1
1+
(
µA
j
1−µA
j
) 1
1−ρ
(
(1+sA
i,j,t
)
(1+τA
j,i,t
)
wj,t
wi,t
θA
i,t
θA
j,t
) ρ
ρ−1

 1+
(
µI
i
1−µI
i
) 1
1−ρ
(
(1+sI
j,i,t
)
(1+τI
i,j,t
)
wi,t
wj,t
θI
j,t
θI
i,t
) ρ
ρ−1
1+
(
µI
j
1−µI
j
) 1
1−ρ
(
(1+sI
i,j,t
)
(1+τI
j,i,t
)
wj,t
wi,t
θI
i,t
θI
j,t
) ρ
ρ−1

,
and ΘAi,t =

ξ
1
1−ω
A (PAj,t)
ω
ω−1
∑
m={A,I,S}ξ
1
1−ω
m (Pmj,t)
ω
ω−1
(
1−
PAj,tA¯
Ξj,t
)
+
PAj,tA¯
Ξj,t
ξ
1
1−ω
A (PAi,t)
ω
ω−1
∑
m={A,I,S}ξ
1
1−ω
m (Pmi,t)
ω
ω−1
(
1−
PA
i,t
A¯
Ξi,t
)
+
PA
i,t
A¯
Ξi,t


ξ
1
1−ω
I (PIj,t)
ω
ω−1
∑
m={A,I,S}ξ
1
1−ω
m (Pmj,t)
ω
ω−1
(
1−
PA
j,t
A¯
Ξj,t
)
ξ
1
1−ω
I (PIi,t)
ω
ω−1
∑
m={A,I,S}ξ
1
1−ω
m (Pmi,t)
ω
ω−1
(
1−
PA
i,t
A¯
Ξi,t
)

.
ΛAi,t measures the relative size of country i policy-related trade barriers in Agriculture com-
pared to Industry. ΓAi,t measures the relative size of country j to country i final good pro-
ducer’s expenditure share on the imported variety of Agriculture compared to Industry.
And, ΘAi,t measures the relative size of the country j to country i consumer expenditure
share of Agriculture compared to Industry, including expenditure on subsistence consump-
tion of Agriculture. If country i is relatively poor, its subsistence spending on agriculture is
relatively high and this reduces the trade balance of Agriculture. The higher is each of these
terms, the larger are country i net exports of Agriculture relative to Industry.
To illustrate conditions under which trade patterns are solely dictated by comparative
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cost advantage, abstract from home bias and trade policies, µki = µ
k
j = 0.5, τ
k
i,j,t = τ
k
j,i,t =
ski,i,t = s
k
j,i,t = 0, for k = A, I and i 6= j, and income effects for consumer expenditure A¯ = 0 .
Assume arbitrarily that country i has a comparative cost advantage in Agriculture at date
t, for i 6= j,
pAi,t
pIi,t
=
θIi,t
θAi,t
<
θIj,t
θAj,t
=
pAj,t
pIj,t
,
and let
pAj,t
pAi,t
= (1 + ǫt)
pIj,t
pIi,t
, ǫt > 0 . Now, x
A
i,t ≡ Γ
A
i,tΘ
A
i,t is
xAi,t =
1 +
(
(1 + ǫt)
pIj,t
pIi,t
) ρ
1−ρ
1 +
(
(1 + ǫt)
pIj,t
pIi,t
) ρ
ρ−1

1 +
(
pIj,t
pIi,t
) ρ
ρ−1
1 +
(
pIj,t
pIi,t
) ρ
1−ρ
[PAj,tP Ii,t
PAi,tP
I
j,t
] ω
ω−1
≡ ΓAi,t
[
PAj,tP
I
i,t
PAi,tP
I
j,t
] ω
ω−1
(3.23)
and it is easy to show that xAi,t > 1 - Agriculture runs a trade surplus.
When a relatively low producer price of country i ’s variety of Agriculture reflects a
comparative cost advantage, final good producers’ expenditure share on variety i in Agri-
culture rises relative to that in Industry in both countries. Country i ’s export share of
Agriculture relative to Industry rises, its import share of Agriculture relative to Industry
falls, and ΓAi,t > 1. Relative consumption expenditure Θ
A
i,t = 1 . In general, a relatively
low country i producer price of Agriculture reduces its price index relative to that of In-
dustry in both countries since in country i (j ) the relative home (imported) variety price of
Agriculture falls. When goods are complements (substitutes), consumers in both countries
reduce (increase) their expenditure on Agriculture relative to Industry, reducing (increasing)
both exports and imports of country i Agriculture relative to Industry. With no home bias,
consumer prices of Agriculture and Industry are identical across countries and the export
and import expenditure effects cancel exactly.
4 Calibration
We now calibrate the model of Section 3 to data from South Korea and the OECD. We
treat Korea as the home country and an OECD aggregate as the foreign country wherever
availability of the data required to match objects in the model makes this possible, and the
23
United States as the foreign country when OECD data is unavailable - the instances of which
we note explicitly below.
The OECD aggregate includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and United States. This aggregate accounted for an average of a sub-
stantial 68 percent of South Korean exports and 71 percent of South Korean imports annually
over the period 1963-2000 and is, as a result, our preferred measure of the second country
in this two country world economy model. Since China’s external liberalization would in-
evitably play an important role in Korean trade patterns and domestic performance, we end
the sample in 2000 to isolate the impact of opening to trade and trade reform policies of
Korea.
4.1 Data Inputs
4.1.1 Tariff and Subsidy Rates
We construct time-series of estimated average tariff and subsidy rates for the two traded
good sectors in both countries for the period 1963 through 2000. Complete annual average
tariff rate estimates by sector are unavailable for this sample period for South Korea, so
we draw on multiple sources for estimates of average tariff rates by sub-period and splice
them. We construct two alternative time-series estimates: “Tariff Estimate I” and “Tariff
Estimate II”. The data appendix explains in detail how we construct the two series and
Table 1 presents them. We find that the results from simulations using Tariff Estimate I
and Tariff Estimate II are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. Hence, we elect to
report results for only one of the series, average Tariff Estimate I in Section 5.
Average tariff rates by sector imposed by the OECD on South Korean imports we proxy
with World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) - Trade Analysis and Information System
(TRAINS) -data of the World Bank and use the AHS (effectively applied tariffs) rates. For
the period 1988 through 2010, simple average effective import tariff rates imposed by the
US on Korean imports are available. We use the rates for 1988 through 2000 as inputs
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to our model. Using a constant annual growth rate calculated for the 1989-2010 period,
we construct tariffs on agriculture (defined as food-SITC 0+1+22+4- and agricultural raw
materials -SITC 2-22-27-28) and manufacturing imports for the period 1963-1987. The entire
constructed time series for 1963 through 2000 is shown in Table 2.
For our estimated time series of average subsidy rates by sector in South Korea, we
use the industrial gross subsidy rate series calculated through 1980 by Collins and Park
(1989). It is widely believed that quantitatively significant subsidies ended in South Korea
during the 1980s, and the Collins and Park estimates are zero after 1980. Unfortunately,
we are unaware of any estimates of average agricultural subsidy rates although they were
reputedly large as Teignier (2012) reports, and so we assume in our benchmark calibration
that agricultural subsidies are awarded at the same rate as in industry. The subsidy rate
time series that we input is shown in Table 3.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we assume that OECD subsidies offered for
exports to Korea are zero in both sectors throughout the sample period. It is worth noting
that, since subsidies awarded to agriculture and industry are the same in Korea, and both
zero in the OECD, in our benchmark calibration subsidy rates do not distort the pattern of
comparative advantage.
4.1.2 Labor Productivities
Country and sector specific labor productivity, the θki,t, is constructed by dividing value
added by the level of employment in each sector at each date from 1963 through 2000. Value
added data come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank
and employment by sector for Korea and OECD are constructed using the GGDC data base
and the OECD Annual Labor Force Statistics database respectively as we describe in the data
appendix. Notably, value added by sector is not final output of a sector in the data, as it is
in our model absent intermediate goods; gross output by sector is. Given the incompleteness
of gross output by sector data for our sample period, we chose to use value added data.
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4.2 Preference Parameters
The curvature parameter in household preferences, ,ψ, determines the representative
household’s elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. We follow Backus et al. (1992) and
set, ψ=-1; hence, the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is 1
1−ψ
= 0.5. The weight
on the consumption of the sector k good in the consumption aggregate, ξk, and the elas-
ticity of substitution between the three type of goods, ω, are taken from Herrendorf et al.
(Forthcomingb). Specifically, we take proximate averages of each of the parameters across
different specifications of their model where the authors use data on final consumption ex-
penditures for the United States to calibrate each specification. The values we use are
ξA = 0.02, ξI = 0.20, ξS = 0.78. In addition, we let ω = −0.5 implying that the three types
of final good are complements in preferences. Since most countries in the OECD have similar
income levels, we assume that the OECD aggregate has the same consumption expenditure
pattern as the United States.
The subsistence level of consumption of agricultural goods, A¯, is assumed to be the
same for South Korea and the OECD. It is chosen to match the 1963 employment share
of agriculture in South Korea, which is 0.63, and in our benchmark calibration A¯ equals
863.20. This implies that in 1963 the subsistence level of consumption of agricultural goods
accounted for 70 percent of total final consumption expenditure and 96 percent of consump-
tion expenditure on agricultural goods in Korea.
4.3 Trade Parameters
In our model, the Armington weight on the domestic variety in country i ’s final goods
aggregator for each traded goods sector k = A, I, µki is assumed to capture all real costs
of trade which would affect expenditure by final goods producers on domestic varieties of
goods relative to imported varieties, after controlling for the marginal costs of production
in the two countries, and for tariffs and subsidies. To calibrate the values of µAi and µ
I
i for
each country, we use the first order conditions for profit maximization of each sector k’s final
good producer given by (3.9) and (3.10) to deliver the following expressions for the home
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bias parameter and the weight assigned to imported varieties:
µki =
[
pki,ty
k
i,i,t
P ki,tY
k
i,t
]1−ρ [
pki,t
P ki,t
]ρ
(4.1)
1− µki =
 (1+τ
k
i,j,t)
(1+skj,i,t)
pkj,ty
k
i,j,t
P ki,tY
k
i,t

1−ρ  (1+τ
k
i,j,t)
(1+skj,i,t)
pkj,t
P ki,t

ρ
(4.2)
We calibrate the expressions on the right hand sides of (4.1) and (4.2) for each sector
k = {A, I} and country to annual data on Korean and -since there is no comparable OECD
data- US data on expenditures, prices and trade policies. We obtain independent estimates
for the value of µki and 1− µ
k
i period by period which we denote by µ
k
i,t and 1− µ
k
i,t, apply
the following normalizations in each period to ensure that the values of the weights sum to
unity,
µ˜ki,t =
[
µki,t
µki,t + (1− µ
k
i,t)
]
and 1− µ˜ki,t =
[
1− µki,t
µki,t + (1− µ
k
i,t)
]
and compute the sample average of the normalized estimates for each sector k=A,I and
country i=h,f. Although expenditure and price data by sector for South Korea are available
for the sample period 1971 through 2000, the relevant price data for the United States is
available only from 1983. Our time series estimates of µki,t and 1 − µ
k
i,t therefore use data
for 1983 through 2000 for both countries. This means that the South Korean subsidy rates
shown in Table 3 are irrelevant for the calibrated value of (4.2) since estimated export subsidy
rates are zero after 1980.
Specifically, to compute the share of spending on the domestic variety in the numerator
of the first term of (4.1), we subtract from nominal value added of a sector the nominal value
of the sector’s exports to estimate nominal spending on the domestic variety by domestic final
good producers. For both Korea and the US, nominal value added data by sector is taken
from the World Development Indicators (2003). For Korea, we use the value of exports by
sector to the rest of the world obtained from a data set provided by Robert Feenstra (SITC
Revision 2), and for the United States we use the value of exports by sector to the rest of
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the world from the WITS database of the World Bank. Total spending on both varieties by
sector in the denominator of the first term on the right hand side of (4.1) is constructed as
the sum of value added less exports of the sector and spending on imports from the rest of
the world by sector, drawn from Feenstra’s data (Korea) and the WITS database (United
States). The second term in equation (4.1) is the producer price of the domestic variety
used in sector k’s final good relative to the consumer price index of sector k in country i.
To compute it, we use Korean producer price indexes by sector obtained from the Bank of
Korea, data on US producer price indexes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and consumer
price indexes by sector for both Korea and the US are constructed using data from the Bank
of Korea and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, following the methodology in Herrendorf et
al. (Forthcomingb) and described in the data appendix.
To compute the share of spending on the foreign variety in the first term of (4.2), we
use data on the value of imports from the rest of the world by sector from Robert Feenstra
(Korea) and WITS (United States), and the same measure of total spending on both varieties
for the denominator as we constructed for (4.1). The second term of (4.2) reflects the price
paid by a final good producer in sector k of country i for the imported variety relative to
the consumer price index of sector k in country i. To calibrate import prices in the second
term of (4.2) we use import price index data by sector from the Bank of Korea and the
Bureau of Economic Analysis for Korea and the US respectively, and our estimates of tariff
rates from 1983 onwards in Tables 1 and 2. Feenstra’s import value data include the value
of any tariffs and so yield a good estimate of the numerator in the first component of (4.2)
at each date. The import price data that we use to calibrate the second term, by contrast,
are measured inclusive of “cost, insurance and freight” (CIF) but do not reflect the value of
tariffs. We therefore include our estimated tariff series in calibrating the numerator in the
second component of (4.2). Specifically, for Korea we compute µki,t and 1− µ
k
i,t using Tariff
Estimate I and Estimate II separately, and compare our final (normalized, sample average)
results.
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The resulting values of the Armington weights by sector, and for each constructed tariff
rate series, are shown in Table 4. Since the calibrated values are not very different across
the two alternative tariff measures, we use those computed using Tariff Estimates I.
A key parameter of the model is ρ which controls the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods, 1
1−ρ
. International real business cycle (IRBC) models need small
values of this elasticity to generate the volatility of the terms-of-trade and the negative
correlation between the terms-of-trade and the trade balance that are found in the data.
For example, Backus et al. (1994) and Zimmermann (1997) use an elasticity of 1.50. By
contrast, general equilibrium models need large values of the elasticity to explain the growth
in trade volumes that results from tariff reductions. Yi (2003) shows that these models
need an elasticity of 12 or more to match the magnitude of trade growth observed in post-
liberalization data. Anderson and Wincoop (2004) survey the literature and establish a range
of values between 5 and 10. Eaton and Kortum (2002) establish a range for the elasticity
estimate between 3.6 and 12.8, with their preferred strategy yielding a value in the middle of
this range. However, Simonovska and Waugh (2011) show that the small sample size of the
price data used in this strategy results in a small sample bias. Correcting for this bias, they
find a lower and narrower range of 2.47 to 5.51, with a preferred estimate of 4.4. Giri (2012)
also shows that, within the Eaton and Kortum framework, the elasticity estimate needed
to match the cross-country dispersion in prices of individual goods ranges from 1.72 to 5.5.
In line with these latest estimates, we choose a value of 4 for the elasticity which implies
ρ=0.75. However, we also conduct sensitivity analysis in which we allow the elasticity to be
as low as 2, and as high as 8.
5 Results
5.1 Benchmark Open Economy Model Performance
In our benchmark open economy model, the preference parameters, Armington tech-
nology, and subsistence consumption level in agriculture are calibrated as we have described
in Section 4. Tariff Estimate I for agriculture and industry and industrial subsidy rates for
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South Korea, tariff rates for agriculture and industry for the OECD, and measured labor
productivity by sector for both countries are time series inputs.
In Figure 4 we plot the benchmark model’s predicted shares of employment by sector
for South Korea against those observed in the data for the period 1963 through 2000. Quan-
titatively, the model matches reasonably well the magnitude of decline in the employment
share of agriculture and the magnitude of increase in the employment shares of industry and
services over the sample period. The employment share of agriculture fell from 0.63 in 1963
to 0.11 in 2000 in Korea, while the model predicts a decline from 0.63 in 1963 to 0.08 in 2000,
a 3 percentage point over-prediction of the magnitude of decline. The employment share of
industry increased from 0.11 in 1963 to 0.29 in 2000 in the Korean data, while the model
predicts an increase from 0.21 to 0.32, an under-prediction error of 7 percentage points. The
employment share of services increased from 0.25 to 0.61 in the data, and from 0.15 to 0.60
in the model, an over prediction error of 9 percentage points.
While the Korean data show a mild hump shape in the industrial sector employment
share - which declines from a peak of 0.36 in 1991 to 0.29 in 2000 - the model predicts a
flattening of the employment share from 0.29 in 1991 to 0.31 in 2000, but no decline. In
addition, the model over-predicts industry’s 1963 share of employment and under-predicts
that of services, and produces an initial decline in the employment share of industry from
1963 through 1967 from 0.21 to 0.14 before it begins to rise while the employment share in
the data shows no such decline.
Table 5 records the values of some goodness of fit summary statistics.5 The statistics
in the first two rows of the table quantify the distance between the predicted and actual
time series of the employment share of each sector, according to two standard criteria; the
sum of squared prediction errors (SSE) and the root mean squared prediction error statistic
5The sum of squared errors statistic, for outcome variable X, is defined as SSE =
∑T
t=1(Xt − Xˆt)
2 where T is the number
of years, X is the data value, and Xˆ is the model’s predicted value. This is computed by sector, and the “total” statistic is
just the sum of these across sectors. The root mean squared error statistic is RMSE =
√
SSE
T
. The correlation statistic is
defined as CORR =
∑T
t=1(Xt − µx)(Xˆt − µXˆ)/(T − 1)/
√
(var(Xt)var(Xˆt)) where µj denotes the sample mean of variable j,
and var(j) denotes the sample variance.
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(RMSE) respectively. We also present the summation of SSE’s over sectors, the “total” SSE,
and the associated “total” RMSE for the model. The statistics presented in the third row of
the table are the sample correlation coefficients between the model’s predicted time series for
the share of a sector and that in the data, and measure the similarity of annual fluctuations
in the two. The sample correlations between predicted and actual employment shares of
each sector are positive and high; they are 0.963, 0.757, and 0.937 for agriculture, industry,
and services respectively while the SSE is 0.1 or lower in each sector, and the total SSE is
0.291.6
Figures 6a and 6b show the benchmark model’s performance in matching the export,
import, and trade shares in GDP of sectors. The model vastly over predicts the total
size of trade in South Korea especially early in the sample period. This is almost entirely
attributable to a large over-prediction of the export and import to GDP ratios of agriculture
early in the sample period. By the year 2000, agricultural exports in GDP predicted by
the model fall to less than one-third of their 1963 value, and imports fall by one half. By
contrast, Korea’s trade in industrial products is quite well matched by the model. The size
of industrial imports in GDP predicted by the model is approximately correct, as is the
magnitude of its growth over time. Although industry’s export to GDP ratio is slightly
over-predicted, the increase over time in industry’s GDP share of exports is of roughly the
right magnitude. Nonetheless, because total trade in agriculture is about twelve times that
observed in the data in 1963, the model counterfactually predicts that total trade in GDP
slightly declines over the sample period.
The trade balances of agriculture and industry for our benchmark model, evaluated at
world prices, are shown in Figure 8. At world prices, trade must be balanced. Agriculture
6A full set of results for the models match to GDP shares is available from the authors upon request. The model is less
successful in matching quantitatively the GDP shares of sectors. That its performance in matching shares of GDP shares and
employment shares is different is perfectly predictable since GDP shares evolve rather differently from employment shares in the
data,while a Ricardian model implies that GDP and employment shares are identical. We found in a sensitivity experiment that
for agriculture and services, the poorer match of the model to GDP than employment shares is attributable to our calibration
of subsistence consumption of agriculture to the 1963 employment rather than GDP share of agriculture (primarily a “level”
effect). The models better performance in matching industry’s employment than GDP share, however, appears independent of
this calibration choice.
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runs a deficit from 1963 throughout the sample and industry an exactly offsetting surplus.
However, in 1963 measured labor productivities are such that Korea has a comparative
advantage in agriculture in our model, and the 1963 values of tariffs and subsidies distort
relative international prices of varieties across sectors further in favor of a Korean agricultural
trade surplus. We find that the model’s prediction for the pattern of trade, as well as its over-
prediction of agricultural trade in GDP, are attributable to the interaction of non-homothetic
preferences with relative incomes as we now document. 7
5.2 The Role of Non-Homothetic Preferences for Trade
The presence of subsistence consumption raises the relative share of agriculture in
consumer expenditure when income is low and disproportionately reduces it as income rises
(see equation 3.14). In a sensitivity experiment, we assume that preferences in both countries
are homothetic so that A¯ equals zero. As Figures 7a and 7b show, Korean agriculture’s export
to GDP ratio in 1963 falls from 30 percent in the benchmark model to 10 percent, although is
still much higher than in the data, and its 1963 import to GDP ratio falls from 37 percent to
about 5 percent or about equal to that in the data. The decline in agriculture’s consumption
share in the two countries reduces predicted total trade in 1963 from 80 percent of GDP in
the benchmark model to about 46 percent.
Moreover, in 1963 when Korea is relatively poor, there is a much larger expenditure
share of subsistence consumption of agriculture in South Korea than in the OECD. The
larger agricultural imports than exports which result dominate the pattern of trade rather
than the pattern of comparative advantage. When A¯ equals zero, the pattern of comparative
advantage - distorted by tariffs and subsidies - dictates trade patterns and the model predicts
that Korea runs a trade surplus in agriculture in 1963 as we show in Figure 9. Only in 1980
does comparative advantage shift sufficiently in favor of Korean industry that it runs a trade
surplus, and only after 1995 does it do so consistently.
7In Appendix D, we present a sensitivity analysis of the trade and structural transformation predicted by our benchmark
model when we calibrate it for alternative values of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties, ρ. In
summary, ρ = 0.75, which implies a mid-range elasticity of four, generates a closer match of the model to employment data
overall than does either a high elasticity of eight or a low elasticity of two.
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Not surprisingly in light of extant results in the literature, while abstracting from
agricultural subsistence consumption improves the model’s performance in matching trade
volumes it deteriorates substantially its match to structural transformation, which we doc-
ument in Table 6. The model’s total SSE for employment shares rises 1550 percent and the
SSE and RMSE for employment shares increase for each sector. The large deterioration for
employment shares is partly a result of losing the free parameter to match agriculture’s ini-
tial share of employment in Korea, and partly because the influence of the level and growth
of relative income for resource allocation in agriculture relative to services is eliminated, as
can be seen in Figure 5. As is also noted by Uy et al. (2011), industry’s expenditure share
is relatively undisturbed by the specification of preferences.
Figures 10a and 10b show the level and rate of increase of Korean relative income per
capita predicted by the benchmark model. Although relative real GDP per worker -which
equals the relative real wage in our model over-predicts the level of relative GDP per capita
in the data, Korea’s predicted income per worker is only twenty percent that of the OECD
in 1963, and the resulting large subsistence consumption share in Korea is why we observe
trade deficits in agriculture early in the sample. Figure 10b shows the model predicts slower
relative growth of Korean GDP per worker over much of the sample compared to the data,
however. This exacerbates the powerful role of income differences compared to comparative
advantage for the pattern of trade in our model.
5.3 Counterfactuals
5.3.1 Closed Economy Model
Closing the economy and comparing its quantitative performance in matching the data
to that of our benchmark open economy is a measure of how important openness to trade and
measured trade policies are in our model’s ability to account for South Korean structural
transformation. To close the economy, we set µkKOR = µ
k
OECD = 1 for all k. All other
parameters maintain their benchmark values, except the subsistence level of agriculture. This
is re-calibrated so that the prediction of the closed economy model for agriculture’s initial
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employment share in Korea matches the observed 1963 employment share of agriculture in
the data.8
Figure 11 shows that the closed economy model can capture some of the decline in the
employment share of agriculture in Korea. However, it does a poorer job of matching the
magnitude of decline than does the benchmark open economy model. As we noted above,
the employment share of agriculture fell from 0.63 in 1963 to 0.11 in 2000 in the Korean
data; the closed economy model forecasts a fall from 0.63 in 1963 to 0.17 in 2000, an under-
prediction error of 6 percentage points. This contrasts to the open economy’s 3 percentage
point over-prediction of the magnitude of agriculture’s employment share decline.
There are several reasons for the muting of decline in agriculture’s share in the closed
economy. A much larger calibrated value of subsistence in agriculture is required to match
its initial employment share in the absence of agricultural exports which marginally slows
the consumer’s reallocation of expenditure from agriculture into services. Growth in the
service sector employment share is also smaller as a result, but actually a little closer to
that observed in the data. The employment share of services increased from 0.25 to 0.61 in
the data, and from 0.24 to 0.63 in the closed economy model, an over prediction of only 4
percentage points compared to an over prediction of 9 percentage points in the benchmark
model.
More importantly, a source of decline in agriculture’s export to GDP ratio and em-
ployment share in the benchmark economy is a shift of comparative advantage in favor of
industry over the sample period which is exacerbated by a sharp decline in Korean tariffs on
agricultural relative to industrial imports from 1968 through 1979. As a result, the closed
economy model produces less industrialization than the benchmark economy, measured by
the employment share of industry. This share increased from 0.11 in 1963 to 0.29 in 2000 in
the Korean data, while the closed economy model predicts an increase from 0.12 to only 0.20.
This prediction error of 10 percentage points compares unfavorably to an under-prediction
8Obviously, since there are no distortionary trade policies in the closed economy, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto
efficient.
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error of 7 percentage points in the benchmark economy.
The closed economy model matches better the 1963 employment shares of industry and
services, reducing the former and raising the latter. This is because the benchmark model
generates too much trade early in the sample, when trade was factually a small percentage
of GDP. The absence of industrial exports, and the larger subsistence parameter required to
match agriculture’s initial employment share in the absence of agricultural exports,reduces
the predicted 1963 consumption and employment share of industry. The 1963 domestic con-
sumer expenditure share of services must rise and does so - when final goods are complements
- because the relative consumer price of services is higher in the closed economy.
In Table 5, according to most (although not all) of our summary statistics, the bench-
mark open economy model outperforms the closed economy model in matching Korea’s
employment share data. Closing the economy raises the total SSE by 92 percent. The corre-
lation coefficients for employment shares by sector generally are a little higher for the closed
than the open economy model however, ranging from 0.907 to 0.991, but substantially higher
for industry. The correlation between the predicted and actual employment share of industry
is 0.95 in the closed economy and 0.757 in the benchmark economy. The interaction of trade
policies with the pattern of comparative cost advantage in the open economy is responsible
for the relatively low correlation of industry’s share of employment predicted by the bench-
mark model with that in the data. Specifically, these two features of the benchmark together
produce a) the counterfactual decline of industry’s share of employment from 1963 through
1967, which is coincident with a large drop in measured subsidies, and b) the absence of
any downward portion of the “hump” shape observed in industry’s share of employment.
A very small downward movement can be observed in the employment share of industry
after 1996 in the closed economy model. Nonetheless, the benchmark open economy model
with international labor productivity differentials, tariffs and subsidies does a better job of
minimizing the distance between the predicted and actual data overall relative to the closed
economy, and substantially better for industry’s employment share.
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5.3.2 Controlling for International Productivity Differentials
The data on relative labor productivity by sector in Figure 2b suggest that Korea
experienced an industrial sector labor productivity “take-off” from the early 1970s relative
to that in the OECD, and compared to the growth in her agricultural productivity relative
to the OECD, so that the pattern of comparative advantage shifted towards the industrial
sector of Korea and agricultural sector of the OECD. As we have described, in our benchmark
model the pattern of comparative advantage does not always dictate the pattern of trade or
specialization, however. To isolate the impact of comparative cost advantage for structural
transformation we set labor productivity in the OECD for each sector equal to measured
Korean productivity at every date. The absence of relative productivity growth in Korea
also eliminates most of the benchmark model’s predicted relative growth in Korean GDP
per worker after roughly 1972. Consequently, not only is there no role for comparative cost
advantage in determining trade patterns and specialization in this experiment, but there
is only a very minor role for change in the relative sizes of subsistence expenditure. This
counterfactual primarily isolates the role for structural change of tariff and subsidy rates,
and the (constant) configuration of home bias parameters, in the open relative to the closed
economy.
Figure 12 shows that the predictions of the counterfactual and the closed economy for
the levels of and fluctuations in employment shares deviate a little. Agriculture’s predicted
share of employment behaves much like that of the closed economy until 1968 but is a little
lower between 1969 and 1982 and a little higher from 1983. The counterfactual economy
predicts a slightly higher employment share for industry relative to the closed economy
throughout the sample, and their predictions are very similar from 1983. The counterfactual
predicts a lower employment share for services throughout the sample than does the closed
economy, but early in the sample the two models’ predictions are very similar. The lower
employment share in agriculture relative to the closed economy, and the larger gap between
the counter-factual and closed economy employment share of industry from 1969 until 1982,
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are primarily the result of lower Korean tariff barriers in agriculture relative to industry from
1968 until 1982 and the 1983 reduction in industrial tariffs.
Table 6 shows that the model’s predictive performance relative to the data deteriorates
much as the closed economy’s does by comparison to that of the benchmark economy. The
SSE of the counterfactual model for employment shares of agriculture and industry, and
overall, increase relative to the benchmark while that of services decreases; the total SSE
of the model with respect to employment shares rises by over 56 percent relative to the
benchmark economy. Like the closed economy, this counterfactual model fails to re-allocate
resources from agriculture into industry at the rate observed in the data and in the benchmark
economy.
5.3.3 Controlling For Trade Reform
We attempt to quantify how specific trade reform policies enacted in Korea are re-
sponsible for the goodness of fit to the data of our benchmark open economy model. By
trade reform, we mean the reduction and elimination of tariffs and subsidies which represent
barriers to free trade. 1968 is typically referred to in the literature as the first year of trade
liberalization in Korean, and specifically by Sachs and Warner (1995), and this date coincides
in our data with the first set of tariff reductions in agriculture.
We first counterfactually assume that Korean tariffs were held at their 1967 levels
throughout the sample, while inputting subsidies and OECD tariffs as in the benchmark
economy. 1968 is the first year of tariff liberalization for the agricultural sector, although
tariff reductions of comparable size for industrial products did not begin until 1979 with the
largest reductions from 1983. We do not re-calibrate the Armington weights in this experi-
ment, although a reasonable argument could be made for doing so since average post 1983
tariff rates are reflected in this calibration. Nonetheless, we treat the home bias parameter
as deep, and it is the effect for allocations of changes in trade policies over time that are of
central interest.
Figure 13 shows that had tariffs not been lowered from 1967, a) agriculture’s employ-
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ment share would have been higher until 1989, and especially from 1968 through 1983, than
in the benchmark economy, b) industry’s employment share would have been systematically
lower than in the benchmark economy from 1968 onwards, and c) services’ employment share
would have been systematically higher, especially after 1983. These results are driven by the
inter-temporal pattern of tariff reform. The sharp decline in Korean tariffs on agricultural
imports in 1968 in the data and benchmark economy shifts the effective pattern of compar-
ative advantage against Korean agriculture, and the largest 1983 decline in industrial tariffs
shifts the effective pattern of comparative advantage against industry. In the counterfactual,
we artificially preserve a competitive “edge” in Korean agriculture relative to industry by
maintaining 1967 tariff levels in both sectors. As a result, fewer labor resources leave agri-
culture and move into industry early in the sample, and more resources leave industry for
services due to productivity growth after 1983.
Table 6 shows that the total SSE of the counterfactual economy is 0.368, higher by 26.5
percent than that of 0.291 for the benchmark economy. With respect to employment shares
for individual sectors, the prediction error statistics increase substantially relative to the
benchmark economy for industry and services but decline for agriculture. The correlation
coefficients between the counterfactual model’s predicted employment shares by sector and
the data are extremely similar to those for the benchmark model, however they decline
for industry; accounting for tariff reform after 1967 is quantitatively important for better
matching annual fluctuations in industry’s share of employment.
In a second experiment, we counterfactually abstract from measured subsidy reform
for Korean industrial products, while inputting all tariffs and subsidies to agriculture as
in the benchmark economy. Specifically, we allow subsidies in agriculture to decline as in
the benchmark economy, while maintaining subsidies in industry at their 1967 levels. Table
2 shows that the average industrial subsidy rate fluctuates a little in the late 1960s, but
declines more or less systematically after 1971 and is zero after 1980.
Awarding a counterfactually high subsidy rate to Korean industry for much of the
38
sample distorts the pattern of comparative advantage in its favor, and deteriorates Koreas
terms of trade, relative to the benchmark economy. Figure 14 shows that as a result, a) there
is excessive re-allocation of labor into industry from agriculture after 1971, when industrial
subsidies begin to decline in the benchmark economy and data, and especially after 1980
when they are eliminated completely, and b) the smaller increase in government transfer
income after 1980 relative to our benchmark model, in which subsidies to both sectors are
eliminated, produces a smaller reallocation of labor from industry to services and services
lower share in the counterfactual is therefore closer to that in the data.
Accounting for industrial subsidy reform in our benchmark model is quantitatively im-
portant for limiting the magnitude of predicted industrialization relative to the data. There
is a significant deterioration in the match of the counterfactual model to the data relative
to the benchmark economy as Table 6 shows; the total SSE of the model increases by 62
percent. Improved measures of agricultural subsidies, however, are needed for evaluating the
impact of agricultural export subsidy reform. Since we are forced by the lack of agricultural
subsidy data to input the same, industrial subsidy rate in both sectors, abstracting from
subsidy reform in both sectors simultaneously has little impact for our results as subsidies
do not affect the pattern of comparative advantage. Our measured industrial subsidy se-
ries legitimately reflects industrial sector reform over the sample period but not agricultural
subsidy reform.
6 Conclusion
We have identified three quantitatively important mechanisms through which interna-
tional trade affects structural transformation in our two-country model. First, we find that
changes in relative international per capita income, when preferences are non-homothetic and
the income elasticity of demand in agriculture is less than one, dominate international trade
and specialization patterns in Korea over much of the sample period and are a significant
source of structural change. Second, changes in relative international labor productivities
across sectors, which determine the pattern of comparative cost advantage, are quantita-
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tively important determinants of structural transformation, although are inextricably linked
to relative international income growth. Third, changes in relative international tariff and
subsidy rates across sectors, which distort the pattern of comparative advantage, cause quan-
titatively important deviations of sectoral allocations of employment from those observed in
a closed economy even when we abstract from the evolution of comparative advantage and
the real income growth that relative productivity improvements generate. And specifically,
measured trade reform after 1967 in Korea improves the model’s accuracy in predicting
structural change.
Two anomalies produced by our open economy model of structural transformation
call for additional investigation. International specialization a) improves the model’s fit to
structural change but in doing so generates counterfactually high volumes of trade, and b)
improves the model’s match to the magnitude of industrialization, but is equally responsible
for its inability to reproduce any de-industrialization. Finally, since our stylized model ab-
stracts from endogenous labor productivity improvements resulting from tariff and subsidy
reforms, we may under-estimate the scope of trade reform in effecting structural change.
Beyond the scope of the current paper, this is a topic we leave for future work.
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A Appendix 1
Until 1962, South Korea was an “inward oriented” economy, with macroeconomic per-
formance characterized by high unemployment and inflation, and large budget and balance
of payments deficits. To combat inflation, the nominal exchange rate of the won against the
US dollar was fixed, and to bring the balance of payments under control policy makers relied
heavily on import barriers including multiple exchange rates, import licensing, quantitative
restrictions, and high tariffs on selected items. Although some export incentives were intro-
duced in the 1950s import substitution policies overtly encouraged production for domestic
rather than for export markets and international trade between South Korea and the rest of
the world was small. Figure 1shows that Korean exports were trivial in 1963 and imports
were roughly 12 percent of GDP.
Korea’s openness to trade began after Chung He Park took control of the government
in 1961. The exchange rate system was unified in that year, and the Korean won was
devalued from 130 won to 255 won per U.S. dollar in 1964. Trade policy initially consisted
of export promotion policies beginning with the first five year plan implemented from 1962
which focused on the development of key export industries. Export sector specific incentives
introduced during the 1960s included a preferential tax system, a preferential loan system,
and various administrative support systems. While some export sector incentives freed
Korean exporters to buy imported inputs and sell their outputs at prevailing world prices,
many were distortionary subsidies that enhanced the profitability of export sales relative to
domestic sales.
The preferential tax system, for example, included tariff exemptions on raw materials,
intermediate goods and capital goods devoted specifically to export production; exemptions
from indirect taxes on intermediate inputs and export sales; lower direct taxes on profits
earned specifically through export activities; the introduction of reserve funds to develop
new foreign markets and to defray export losses; and an accelerated depreciation allowance
for fixed capital used directly in export production.
While the system of export incentives continued in the 1970s, the scope of subsidies was
reduced and trade “reform” began. For example, a 50 percent reduction in taxes on profits
from export earnings was abolished and in 1975 the system of tariff exemptions on imported
inputs used in export production was changed to a “drawback” system. However, preferential
loans for export activities were significantly expanded throughout this decade, increasing
from 5.1 percent of total domestic credit in 1966 to 20.5 percent in 1978, although this
expansion was accompanied by a gradual reduction of the interest rate differential between
preferential and ordinary loans. In 1988, export related preferential loans were limited to
small firms only.
Import controls were not relaxed until the late 1960’s, and agricultural tariff reform
began in 1968. Substantial industrial tariff reductions did not take place until 1979 and
1983. In the early 1960’s, import controls were actually tightened in order to bring the
trade deficit under control. The simple average of legal tariff rates reached a peak of nearly
40 percent in 1962 and remained at that level throughout the 1960s. Quantity restrictions
were also used extensively to control imports although these were reduced significantly after
1967; while 88 percent of all import items were subject to quantity restrictions in the first
half of 1967, in the second half of 1967 more than 60 percent of basic import items became
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automatically approved for import. However, the approval rate then fell steadily until 1975
when it reached 49.1 percent. There was also price based protection of the agricultural
sector through a “high-rice-price” policy introduced in the late 1960s. Finally, in 1983 the
government announced the first time-phased import liberalization plan for the period 1983-
88. The range of tariff rates was to be reduced, and the average tariff rate lowered from 23.7
percent in 1983 to 18.1 percent in 1988. A second tariff reform phase for 1989-93 reduced
the average tariff rate from 18.1 percent in 1988 to 7.9 percent in 1995.
Korea’s export promotion and subsequent export and import liberalization policies are
represented in our quantitative analysis by time-series of estimated average export subsidy
and average effective import tax rates, the construction of which we describe in the Data
Appendix (Appendix D).
B Appendix 2 - Tables
Table 1: Tariff Measures for South Korea by Sector
Average Tariff Rate (%)-Estimate I Average Tariff Rate (%)-Estimate II
Year Industry Agriculture Industry Agriculture
1962 60.72 66.55 60.72 66.55
1963 60.72 66.55 60.72 66.55
1964 60.72 66.55 60.72 66.55
1965 60.72 66.55 60.72 66.55
1966 60.72 66.55 60.72 66.55
1967 60.72 66.55 60.72 66.55
1968 70.6 36.5 70.6 36.5
1969 70.6 36.5 70.6 36.5
1970 70.6 36.5 70.6 36.5
1971 70.6 36.5 70.6 36.5
1972 70.6 36.5 70.6 36.5
1973 67.78 32.44 67.78 32.44
1974 67.78 32.44 67.78 32.44
1975 67.78 32.44 67.78 32.44
1976 67.78 32.44 67.78 32.44
1977 67.78 32.44 67.78 32.44
1978 67.78 32.44 67.78 32.44
1979 49.42 29.48 49.42 29.48
1980 49.42 29.48 49.42 29.48
1981 49.42 29.48 49.42 29.48
1982 49.42 29.48 49.42 29.48
1983 22.6 31.4 31.91 43.49
1984 20.6 29.6 29.09 41
1985 20.3 28.8 28.66 39.89
1986 18.7 27.1 26.4 37.54
1987 18.2 26.4 25.7 36.57
1988 16.9 25.2 23.86 34.9
1989 11.2 20.6 15.81 28.53
1990 9.7 19.9 13.7 27.56
1991 9.7 19.9 13.7 27.56
1992 8.4 18.5 11.86 25.62
1993 7.1 17.8 10.03 24.65
1994 6.2 16.6 8.75 22.99
1995 6.2 16.6 8.75 22.99
1996 6.2 16.6 8.75 22.99
1997 6.2 16.6 8.75 22.99
1998 6.2 16.6 8.75 22.99
1999 6.2 16.6 8.75 22.99
2000 6.2 16.6 8.75 22.99
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Table 2: Tariff Measures for OECD
by Sector
Average Tariff Rate (%)
Year Manufacturing Agriculture
1963 12.8 4.2
1964 12.5 4.1
1965 12.1 4.1
1966 11.8 4.1
1967 11.5 4.0
1968 11.3 4.0
1969 11.0 4.0
1970 10.7 3.9
1971 10.4 3.9
1972 10.2 3.9
1973 9.9 3.9
1974 9.7 3.8
1975 9.4 3.8
1976 9.2 3.8
1977 8.9 3.7
1978 8.7 3.7
1979 8.5 3.7
1980 8.3 3.7
1981 8.1 3.6
1982 7.9 3.6
1983 7.7 3.6
1984 7.5 3.5
1985 7.3 3.5
1986 7.1 3.5
1987 6.9 3.5
1988 6.8 3.4
1989 6.6 3.4
1990 6.6 3.4
1991 6.7 3.0
1992 6.6 3.4
1993 6.7 3.2
1994 6.7 3.2
1995 5.9 3.2
1996 5.6 3.0
1997 5.3 3.0
1998 4.7 3.1
1999 4.3 3.8
2000 4.2 3.6
Table 3: Export Subsidies in South
Korea
Year Subsidy Rate (%)
1958 130.4
1959 172.0
1960 136.2
1961 18.1
1962 16.6
1963 45.8
1964 31.3
1965 14.8
1966 19.1
1967 23.0
1968 28.1
1969 27.8
1970 28.4
1971 29.7
1972 26.8
1973 23.7
1974 21.2
1975 16.7
1976 16.9
1977 19.2
1978 19.5
1979 20.2
1980 21.3
Note: Export
subsidies include
direct cash subsi-
dies, export dollar
premium, direct tax
reduction, interest
rate preference,
indirect tax exemp-
tions, and tariff
exemptions
Table 4: Calibrated Values of Armington Weights
Tariff Estimate I Tariff Estimate II
µ
A
KOR
= 0.37 µA
KOR
= 0.36
µ
I
KOR
= 0.34 µI
KOR
= 0.33
µ
A
OECD
= 0.53 µA
OECD
= 0.53
µ
I
OECD
= 0.55 µI
OECD
= 0.55
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Table 5: Model Performance Measures for South Korea
Open Economy
µAKOREA = 0.37, µ
I
KOREA = 0.34, µ
A
OECD = 0.53, µ
I
OECD = 0.55, A = 863.20
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 0.105 0.093 0.093 0.291
Root Mean Squared Error 0.053 0.049 0.05 0.088
Correlation Coefficient 0.963 0.757 0.937
Closed Economy
µki = 1 ∀ k, i, A = 1523.42
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 0.081 0.333 0.141 0.555
Root Mean Squared Error 0.046 0.094 0.061 0.121
Correlation Coefficient 0.991 0.95 0.968
Table 6: Model Performance Measures for South Korea: Benchmark versus Counterfactuals
Benchmark Open Economy
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 0.105 0.093 0.093 0.291
Root Mean Squared Error 0.053 0.049 0.049 0.088
Correlation Coefficient 0.963 0.757 0.937
Open Economy with A¯ = 0
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 2.449 0.112 2.248 4.810
Root Mean Squared Error 0.254 0.054 0.243 0.356
Correlation Coefficient 0.917 0.778 0.791
Open Economy - OECD Productivities Equal to South Korea
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 0.154 0.240 0.059 0.453
Root Mean Squared Error 0.064 0.080 0.039 0.109
Correlation Coefficient 0.985 0.692 0.950
Open Economy - Tariffs at 1967 Values
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 0.064 0.141 0.163 0.368
Root Mean Squared Error 0.041 0.061 0.066 0.098
Correlation Coefficient 0.975 0.708 0.948
Open Economy - Subsidies in Industry at 1967 Values
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 0.244 0.162 0.065 0.471
Root Mean Squared Error 0.080 0.065 0.041 0.111
Correlation Coefficient 0.960 0.890 0.927
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C Appendix 3 - Figures
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(b) Imports-to-GDP Ratio
Figure 1: Evolution of Trade in South Korea (with OECD), 1963-2000
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(b) Relative Real Value Added Per Worker by Sector (in 1995 US$),
OECD=100
Figure 2: GDP Per Capita and Labor Productivity in South Korea (relative to OECD),
1963-2000
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(a) Employment Shares by Sector
1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
 
 
Agriculture
Industry
Services
(b) GDP Shares by Sector
Figure 3: Structural Change in South Korea, 1963-2000
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Figure 4: Employment Shares by Sector: Open Economy Model versus Data
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Figure 5: Employment Shares by Sector: Open Economy Model with A¯ = 0 versus Data
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(a) Export to GDP Ratio by Sector
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(b) Import to GDP Ratio by Sector
Figure 6: Evolution of Trade in South Korea - Open Economy Model versus Data
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(a) Export to GDP Ratio by Sector
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(b) Import to GDP Ratio by Sector
Figure 7: Evolution of Trade in South Korea - Open Economy Model with A¯ = 0 versus
Data
51
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
 
 
Agriculture
Industry
Total
Figure 8: Trade Balance at World Prices
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Figure 9: Trade Balance at World Prices with A¯ = 0
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Figure 10: Real GDP per Worker of Korea Relative to OECD (fixed base (1995)) - Open
Economy Model versus Data
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Figure 11: Employment Shares by Sector: Closed vs Open vs Data
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Figure 12: Employment Shares by Sector, OECD productivity = South Korea vs. Bench-
mark vs Closed vs Data
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Figure 13: Employment Shares by Sector, Tariffs = 1967 vs. Benchmark vs Data
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Figure 14: Employment Shares by Sector, Subsidies in Industry = 1967 vs. Benchmark vs
Data
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D Appendix 4 - Sensitivity Analysis for Armington Elasticity
In Table 7 and Figures 15a and 15b, we show the results of sensitivity analysis for our
benchmark open economy model when we calibrate it for alternative values of the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign varieties, ρ. Table 7 replicates the benchmark
open economy performance statistics with respect to its predictions for employment shares
for ρ = 0.75 (an elasticity of substitution of 4), and also shows the values of the statistics
we obtain when ρ = 0.875 (a high elasticity of substitution of 8) and for ρ = 0.5(a low
elasticity of substitution of 2). Figures 15a and 15b show the evolution of export andimport
shares in GDP for South Korea predicted by the model for alternative values of theelasticity
(including the benchmark value of 4).
Table 7 shows that a high value of ρ deteriorates substantially the performance of the
model in matching employment shares both by sector and overall relative to the benchmark
calibration according to the SSE and RMSE criteria. A lower value of ρ unambiguously
deteriorates the fit of the model measured by the SSE and RMSE statistics relative to the
benchmark calibration, except for the employment share of agriculture which is closer to
the data by these criteria. In addition, the correlation of the models industrial employment
share with that in the data declines significantly with a lower ρ. Overall, our baseline value
of ρ = 0.75, or an elasticity of four, seems to generate the most accurate prediction for
employment shares relative to the data of the three alternatives we consider.
Figures 15a and 15b show the impact of alternative values of ρ for export and import
shares of sectors in GDP over time. With respect to export to GDP ratios for agriculture
and industry shown in Figure 15a, and for total exports as a portion of GDP, our baseline
intermediate value generates ratios that lie broadly between those produced by a higher and
lower elasticity. A higher (lower) value of ρ, in general, generates export shares that are more
(less) volatile. Export to GDP ratios with a higher (lower) elasticity fall by more (less) when
export ratios decline, and rise by more (less) when they increase. Import to GDP ratios,
shown in Figure 15b, exhibit the same expected tendency to be more volatile the higher is
ρ. Here, however, while our baseline models industrial import share in GDP and its total
import to GDP ratio lie between the values produced for higher and lower ρ, its agricultural
import share in GDP is highest throughout the sample. Agricultural imports in GDP, as we
show in Section 5, are most strongly influenced the relative size of subsistence consumption
in Korea.
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Table 7: Model Performance Measures for South Korea: Sensitivity to Armington Elasticity
Benchmark Open Economy
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 0.105 0.093 0.0931 0.291
Root Mean Squared Error 0.0526 0.049 0.0495 0.088
Correlation Coefficient 0.963 0.757 0.937
High Elasticity-ρ=0.875
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 0.260 0.158 0.285 0.702
Root Mean Squared Error 0.083 0.064 0.087 0.136
Correlation Coefficient 0.952 0.835 0.943
Low Elasticity-ρ=0.5
Employment Shares
Performance Measure Agriculture Industry Services Total
Sum of Squared Errors 0.077 0.153 0.099 0.329
Root Mean Squared Error 0.045 0.063 0.051 0.093
Correlation Coefficient 0.977 0.641 0.924
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Figure 15: Sensitivity of Trade to Alternative Values of ρ
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E Appendix 5 - Data Appendix
I. SECTOR DEFINITIONS
Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5; includes forestry, hunting, and fishing,
as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production.
Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-14, 15-37, 40-41, 45; includes mining, man-
ufacturing, public utilities and construction.
Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-55, 60-64, 65-74, 75-99; includes wholesale
and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, storage and communication,
finance, insurance and real estate and community, social and personal services.
Since the trade data are based on SITC Rev2., we map the SITC codes into the ISIC
sector definitions.
Agriculture is defined as SITC 0,1,2,4 minus 27, 28;
Industry is the combination of Fuels and Mining - SITC 3 plus 27, 28, 68 -, Manufac-
turing - SITC 5,6,7,8 minus 68 -, and all other SITC codes.
II. SOUTH KOREA
A. Figures
Figure 1 a) Exports to GDP Ratio
b) Imports to GDP Ratio
Bilateral exports and imports for South Korea with the OECD, by sector, are taken
from Feenstra’s Trade Data SITC Revision 2. The GDP (Value added) data are taken from
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2003. Both trade and GDP data are measured in
current US $.
Figure 2 a) Relative Real GDP per Worker
b) Relative Real Value Added per Worker by Sector
Real GDP per worker is proxied by data on real GDP per capita. We obtain these
data from WDI for Korea and they are measured in 1995 constant US$. For the OECD, this
measure has been constructed as a weighted average of individual countries’ GDP per capita,
where weights are the share of that country’s employment in total OECD employment. GDP
data are measured in 1995 constant US$. See attached file ’GDPpercapita OECD’ for details
on how this series has been constructed. In order to get relative real GDP per worker we
divide the Korean real GDP per worker by that of the OECD.
Similarly, in order to get a relative measure of real value added per worker by sector, we
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divide real value added by sector per worker in Korea by that of OECD. Real value added per
worker by sector is constructed by dividing real value added by employment for each sector.
Real value added data measured in 1995 constant US$ is from the WDI 2003, and employ-
ment by sector are obtained from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GDDC)
10 sector database using the ISIC sectorial classifications as described above. Missing values
of real value added in industry and services for Korea for 1963-69 were imputed using the
growth rate of real value added, during 1970-80, in industry and services, respectively.
Figure 3 a) Share in Employment
b) Share in Value Added
Employment shares by sector are constructed using the GDDC 10 sector database. The
10 sectors have been aggregated into Agriculture, Industry & Services as described above.
Value added shares by sector have been constructed using nominal value added data by
sector measured in current US$. These data have been taken from WDI 2003.
B. Tables
Table 1(a): Tariff Measures for South Korea by Sector
We use two different sets of estimates. These estimates have been constructed using
data from different sources for different time periods.
Average tariff rates by sector imposed by South Korea, expressed as a percentage per
unit of that sector’s good imported, are estimated by various authors for alternative sub-
sample periods. We construct two time-series for South Korean tariff rates by sector, which
deviate only from 1983 onwards. This deviation in the two series from 1983 is due to an
adjustment suggested by Nam (1980) to the average tariff rates by sector estimated by Lee
(1995). Nam’s “adjustment” is reflected in the post 1982 numbers in “Tariff Estimate II”,
the unadjusted series is “Tariff Estimate I”, and both are shown in Table 1.
Sources for and construction method of our tariff series from 1963 through 1982 are as
follows. For the years 1963, 1973 and 1979, estimated average agricultural tariff rates are
drawn from Collins and Park (1989) and estimated average tariff rates for industry are from
Lee (1995). Both sets of numbers are adjusted using Nam (1980). For the year 1968, we
use the estimated average tariff rates for both sectors of Nam (1980). For the intermediate
years direct estimates are unavailable; we assume that average tariff rates by sector for the
years 1964 through 1967 are equal to those estimated for 1963; we assume that average tariff
rates by sector for the years 1969 through 1972 are equal to those estimated by Nam for
1968; we assume that average tariff rates by sector for the years 1974 through 1978 are equal
to those estimated for 1973; and we assume that average tariff rates by sector for the years
1980 through 1982 are equal to those estimated for 1979.
Average tariff rates for both sectors for the years 1983 through 1994 are taken from
Kim (1996), which is a continual annual series. Here, average Tariff Estimate II applies
the adjustment suggested by Nam (1980) in each year. For average tariff rates by sector
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from 1995 through 2000, we use estimates from the Bank of Korea which assumes that tariff
rates are constant at the 1994 levels estimated by Kim (1996), again with the Nam (1980)
adjustment applied to Tariff Estimate II.
Table 2: Export Subsidies in South Korea
These are taken from Collins & Park (1989) for the period 1963-1980. Gross subsidy
rates included in this time series include direct cash subsidies, export premiums, direct tax
reductions, preferential interest rate reductions, indirect tax exemptions, and tariff exemp-
tions all expressed as won subsidies per dollar of exports. The series then controls for
changes in the exchange rate, the won price of dollars, so that the gross subsidy rate is
expressed per unit of exported industrial good.
C. Other South Korean Data used in Calibrating the Model:
Labor Productivity of a sector
As we describe in Section 4, this time series is an input to the model, and defined as
real value added per worker in that sector. Hence this is constructed as described above for
Figure 2.
Armington Trade Weights
We have described the construction of the Armington weights (Table 4 in the paper)
in detail in Section 4. In this construction we use the following data series for the 1970- 2000
period:
Nominal Value Added by sector data are from WDI 2003, while data on exports by sec-
tors from South Korea to the world are taken from Robert Feenstra’s data base (SITC Rev 2).
Data on the producer price index (PPI) and import price index (IPI) by sector are taken
from the Bank of Korea The PPI is measured using prices for the domestic market only, and
the import price data are measured inclusive of cost, insurance and freight (CIF). The con-
sumer price indexes are constructed using data provided by the OECD Statistics Database,
following the methodology described in Herrendorf et al. (Forthcomingb) (Appendix D: Ap-
proximate Aggregation of Chained Quantity Indices). See attached file “CPI Korea” for
details on how CPIs for agriculture and industry have been constructed.
III. OECD
The OECD aggregate includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and United States.
A. Figures
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Figure 2 a) Relative Real GDP per Worker
b) Relative Real Value Added per Worker by Sector
Labor productivity in a sector is computed as the weighted average of the individual
countries’ labor productivity (real value added per worker in that sector), where the weights
are the share of a member country in OECD total employment in that sector (which is the
sum of employment across all countries in that sector). Real value added (current US $) by
sector data are taken from the WDI 2003 and are measured in 1995 constant US$. The data
for OECD are available only from 1971 onwards for all countries. We imputed the missing
sectorial value added for 1963-70 by using each sectors growth in value added between 1971
and 2000. Data on employment by sector are constructed using OECD Annual Labor Force
Statistics database. Missing data for sectorial employment for 1963-70 for the OECD is
imputed following the same methodology as in the case for value added. Finally, missing
data for sectorial labor productivity for 1963-1970 for the OECD was imputed following
the same methodology as in the case for value added and employment. See attached file
“LaborProductivitybySector OECD” for details on how this series has been constructed.
B. Tables
Table 1(b): Tariff Measures for OECD by Sector
WITSTRAINS database reports tariff rates applied by the US on Korean imports for
the period 1989-2010. These are defined as Simple Average Effective Applied Tariff Rate
Using a constant annual growth rate calculated for the 1989-2010 period, we construct tar-
iffs on agriculture (defined as food-SITC 0+1+22+4- and agricultural raw materials -SITC
2-22-27-28-) and manufacturing imports for the period 1963-1988.
C. Other OECD/US Data Used in Calibrating the Model
Armington Trade Weights
We have described the construction of the Armington weights in detail in Section 4.
We use the following data series for the 1983 to 2000 period for the US economy: Nominal
Value added by sector data are obtained from WDI 2003, while data on sectorial exports
from US to the world and sectorial imports of the US from the world are taken from the
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database of the World Bank.
Producer price Index data have been taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
For agriculture we use farm products PPI and for industry we use industrial commodities less
fuel PPI. The base year for these indexes has been reset to 2000 (original base year was 1982).
Import price indexes of agriculture and industry are constructed using disaggregated
IPI of SITC codes and these data are obtained from the BLS. We have computed Agriculture
IPI as the product of import shares of SITC 0, 1, 2 (minus 27 and 28) with the corresponding
IPI (Note: BLS does not report data on IPI of SITC 4). The industrial IPI is computed
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as the product of import shares of SITC 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 with the corresponding IPI. The
import shares of the SITC codes are computed using data on US imports from the world
(taken from WITS) and the annual IPI are obtained by computing an average of monthly
IPI. The base year for the IPIs is 2000. See attached file “IPI US” for details on how IPIs
for agriculture and industry have been constructed.
Consumer price indexes by sector are constructed using data from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, following the methodology described in Herrendorf et al. (Forthcomingb)
(Appendix D: Approximate Aggregation of Chained Quantity Indices). See attached file
“CPI US” for details on how CPIs for agriculture and industry have been constructed.
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